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warning compliance and its effects independent from the parameter
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Abstract 
In this article, we analyze the phenomenon of flood evacuation compliance from a both decision-
theoretic and game-theoretic perspective presenting the Warning Compliance Model (WCM). This 
discrete decision model incorporates a Bayesian information system, which formalizes the statistical 
effects of a warning forecast based on the harmonious structure of a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). 
The game-theoretical part of the model incorporates the evacuation order decision of a local 
government and the people’s compliance regarding their evacuation-decisions. The strengths of this 
novel approach lie in the joint consideration of probabilistic and communicative risk aspects of a 
dynamic setting, in the simultaneous consideration of escalation and de-escalation phases and of two 
differently exposed risk groups, which requires differential risk communication. For each scenario, we 
derive the explicit and generic solution of the model, which makes it possible to identify the scope for 
warning compliance and its effects independent from the parameter constellation. Applying empirical 
data from flood and risk studies yields plausible results for the escalation-scenario of the model and 
reveal the limits of compliance if people face a Black Swan flood event. 
1. Introduction 
Natural disasters cause severe damage worldwide, with an upward trend (Alfieri et al. 2016; Bruine de 
Bruin et al.).Whenever natural catastrophes may endanger human life and sufficient warning time 
precedes the occurrence of the event, the immediate evacuation of the population is required. 
Evacuation can be defined as “the process of alerting, warning, deciding, preparing, departing and 
(temporarily) holding people, animals, personal belongings and corporate stock and supplies from an 
unsafe location at a relatively safer location given the actual circumstances“ (Kolen & van Gelder, 
2018). In the context of an evacuation, the questions of whether, and – if answered with yes – when 
and to what extent are among the most difficult decisions to be made by responsible actors such as 
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(local) government and civil protection agencies. The decision problem can be divided into three 
different elements or tasks. First, the occurrence of the potentially dangerous event that could make 
an evacuation necessary must be predicted as accurately as possible by a hazard forecast. In practice, 
this task is performed by Early Warning Systems (EWS), which are usually developed and operated by 
research institutes and commercial (early warning) services specialized in this field. Whether timely 
evacuation is possible at all depends on the scientific and technical performance of these systems on 
the one hand and the specific characteristics of the concrete natural hazard on the other. 
The second task comprises evacuation planning and the evacuation decision itself, which can be either 
a mandatory evacuation request (“order”) or a voluntary evacuation request (“recommendation”) but 
either way this decision is eventually based on a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of public 
decision-makers, weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of an evacuation. While the potential 
lives to be saved play the primary role in this consideration, an evacuation can also involve securing 
critical assets and thus avoiding direct economic damage. However, the measures and operations, 
which have to be put in place within a short period, require a systematic preparation and planning in 
combination with pre-disaster risk communication with the potentially affected population living in 
the risk-prone area. For example, one of the most frequently reported bottlenecks for an effective 
evacuation is unnecessary traffic congestion, i.e. congestion which could have been overcome by 
timely planning of escape-routes as well as pre-disaster planning and training to overcome problems 
of coordination during the evacuation. 
The third aspect, which constitutes a necessary precondition for a successful evacuation, concerns the 
acceptance and evacuation compliance of the population, which requires a good communication 
strategy but also a high credibility of the political decision makers. It should be understood that an 
evacuation, which usually involves leaving one's own home for up to several weeks, is a very 
consequential decision for those affected. There can be many reasons why potentially affected people 
do not comply with an evacuation order. The target group does not perceive the order or it does not 
take it seriously (enough) because it fails to understand the gravity of the situation and instead 
considers the measure to be exaggerated. On the other extreme, people may consider the order as 
too drastic an intervention in their private affairs and therefore give priority to their own crisis micro-
management in the first instance (in particular to stay with vulnerable family members, pets or to 
protect their belongings), which can entail a dangerous loss of time. Further reasons are that people 
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perceive their homes as a safe place, that they don’t know where to go or that they have distrust into 
the public decision makers’ “true objectives”. The last aspect is relevant if people think that e.g. tourists 
are more relevant to the local government’s decision or even in highly problematic contexts where the 
local government misuses an evacuation request in order to get rid of marginalized groups. Hence, 
evacuation compliance depends crucially on the population's trust and credibility in the official 
decision-makers.  
“Approaching evacuation as a process and not as an outcome is key to understanding why some 
evacuate and some do not, and more important, to determining what can be done to motivate more 
compliance.” (Dash & Gladwin, 2007). Following Dash & Gladwin, the objective of this contribution is 
a model-based analysis of an interaction of the three before mentioned tasks of evacuation: hazard 
forecast and early warning, strategic evacuation-decision making as well as evacuation compliance. At 
the center of the warning response model is the evacuation decision of a public decision maker (local 
government) and the evacuation compliance of the potentially affected population.  
The decision problem is as follows: A public decision maker (PDM), e.g. the local government of a 
hypothetical seaside town, receives a forecast or warning from a stylized EWS and has to decide 
whether to issue an non-mandatory evacuation order. We choose an approach from information 
economics and model the EWS as an information system (Bikhchandani et al. 2013). The sequence of 
events and the occurrence of informative signals (emissions or “warnings” in our context) can be 
depicted as a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). Both, the hazard and the evacuation decision, are scalable 
over two levels. The hazard, e.g. a flood, can have an severe impact affecting the residential area near 
the coast (this corresponds to state S1 where a proportion of 𝛾% of the population would be affected 
by flood) or an extreme impact affecting all residents of the whole town (this corresponds to state S2 
affecting the entirety of the local population). Figure 1 illustrates the two potential levels of impact 
taking the example of New Jersey (left picture), a state which was severely hit by hurricanes in the past 
(e.g. hurricane Sandy in 2012) and which led to the identification of flood-risk zones by FEMA. The 
picture to the right in Figure 1 shows the zones of Southeast Louisiana as an example for three risk 
categories (indicated by the colors red, orange and yellow). Depending on the specificities of the 
locations and the local vulnerability profile of the population, there are very often up to five or more 
categories. Although we use the case of two zones for the sake of simplicity it is to note that a higher 
number of risk or evacuation zones increases operational complexity, in particular it becomes more 
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difficult to communicate each citizen which risk zone it belongs to and what this means in terms of 
preparation and reaction. 
Accordingly, conditional on the received signal the authority can either issue a partial evacuation 
focusing at the residential area in the coastal (risk) zone or it can issue a full evacuation for the whole 
region. For the evacuation decision, the authority takes three types of cost into account: The potential 
damage to the population in the case of flooding in an non-evacuated region (either just the coastal 
region or the entire town), the cost of an evacuation incurred by the government and the burden for 
the population in the case of a false alarm. Further details are given in section 4. 
Although the model has a relatively simple structure, it makes it possible to depict two different levels 
of risk and to derive an optimal decision for every outcome based on the Markov chain structure. 
 
Figure 1. Examples of flood risk zones -left: New Jersey (FEMA 2012), right: Southeast Louisiana(State 
of Louisiana) 
The scalability of the decision is an important feature of the model as this often constitutes a major 
problem in practice. Closely related is also the consideration of different population groups 
(heterogeneity). This aspect is considered very important in the literature, as different groups act from 
very different motives and under different circumstances. In the literature, a distinction is made above 
all between groups in risk areas and those outside risk areas, between vulnerable and (less) vulnerable 
groups, and groups that are differentiated according to socio-demographic criteria (age, gender, 
ethnicity). In our model, we limit ourselves to the first point and distinguish between people living 
inside and outside risk areas. This criterion is usually highly relevant for high tide and hurricanes, since 
coastal inhabitants are exposed to a higher risk and usually are well aware of this (official classification 
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into risk zones). We would like to stress that we have not integrated the other criteria into the model 
primarily for reasons of complexity, and not because we consider these further group differentiations 
to be unimportant. On the contrary, our model approach can be extended to include these groups 
relatively easily, provided that data on hazard characteristics, local conditions and demographics are 
available. 
In addition, the model also allows to analyze the de-escalation-decisions (return to “normal”), which 
are absent in most evacuation models. While a situation where no flood yet occurred corresponds to 
the escalation-phase (just evacuation-decisions have to be made), situation S2 represents the de-
escalation-problem. Here, the whole town is already flooded and the people either evacuated the 
period before or they were “forced out of the region” by the flood itself which implied a high risk for 
life and health. Those who evacuated or were lucky to escape in time, now feel the urge to return as 
fast as possible. However, if the flood situation worsens again this can put these people at a new risk, 
which is a frequently overlooked issue in evacuation-modeling. As Sorensen & Sorensen state, „the 
time period for the span of withdrawal is elastic in that the evacuation may last for any amount of 
time, and may occur more than once or sequentially should there be secondary hazards or a 
reoccurrence or escalation of the original threat. For example, while the primary hazards form 
hurricanes are wind and storm surge flooding, secondary threats could include inland riverine flooding 
that might necessitate a second evacuation effort.“ (Sorensen & Sorensen, 2006). To protect the 
people from this kind of “second wave”, the government can decide whether to issue an order to 
remain outside the region. Note that an “evacuation-order” and a “remain-order” just differ with 
respect to the status quo (i.e. whether people are already out of the region or not) because in both 
cases the government aims to incite the population to be absent from home. In situation S1, just the 
coastal area is flooded. This situation represents a combination of escalation (relevant for the rest of 
the town, which is not yet flooded) and de-escalation (relevant for the inhabitants of the coastal area, 
who had to leave the region and are about to return). It is one central feature of this dynamic model 
that it comprises both escalation and de-escalation as well as the more intricate constellation in 
between. The challenge for the authority is to find an optimal policy – conditional on the current state 
and future prediction – which fits to both groups at the same time. 
One further important element of our model is trust of the potentially affected population in the 
government’s communication. Although theoretically the government can enforce an evacuation 
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order, police coercion is for sure the “means of last resort” for public officials. In principle, large-scale 
enforcement in a stressful situation will most probably fail due to lack of time, lack of staff, increased 
opposition by the public and personal discomfort of the executive personnel. Therefore, we assume in 
our model that the government cannot force people to evacuate but it can just influence them in a 
direct and indirect way while both channels depend on trust.  
The first type of trust is the people’s trust in a competent impact assessment on the side of the 
government. While the (unconditional and conditional) event probabilities are common knowledge to 
all decision-makers of our setting, we assume an information asymmetry between the government 
and the public with respect to the impact of a potential flooding event. To put it plainly, people know 
how probable a flood event is but they do not know (as precisely as the regional government knows) 
how severely this flood could hit them. While probabilities and warnings are publicly issued by the 
weather forecasting service, the question how dangerous this event could be for a specific region is 
still a different aspect. By contrast, the local government has access to more and deeper expertise, 
which makes competence-trust valuable at this point. We see a concrete example and further 
justification for this assumption in the first wave of the current Corona-pandemics. Although data 
about the spread of the virus and the upsurge of infections was publicly available at any time, in many 
countries people were skeptical about the drastic restrictions and did not believe in potential damaging 
impacts for themselves. However, in a country like Germany, where trust in government is 
comparatively high, people showed a high degree of acceptance accordingly. 
The second trust component is reliability-trust, which exerts an indirect effect on the public’s 
evacuation decision because it affects the chance for a smooth evacuation. Wilson (2018): “Issuing 
mandatory evacuation orders (…) prior to the landfall of hurricanes can be as or even more disruptive 
and dangerous than the storm itself. For example, 107 of the 120 deaths attributable to Hurricane Rita 
occurred because of extreme temperatures in jammed traffic during the Houston’s evacuation (…). 
More recently, Hurricane Irma in 2017 prompted the evacuation of up to 6.3 million Floridians, one of 
the largest such displacements in American history (…). The storm’s aftermath raised serious questions 
about overburdened infrastructure and the social vulnerability of communities that were unable to 
leave via their own means (…).” Before all events unfold (let’s say in an imaginary period zero) the 
government can invest in better evacuation conditions, such as improved evacuation planning and 
training, contracting for vehicle capacities (e.g. busses which can bring the people out of the affected 
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region) or even the construction of additional roads. We assume that the government has a fixed 
budget for this investment but must decide about the allocation answering the question which region 
(coastal area versus rest of the city) should receive which share of it. As the public cannot directly 
observe all taken measures, it again has to trust that the government did the most to make a smooth 
evacuation possible. A low level of reliability trust leads to the conviction of the inhabitants of both 
regions that they have to cope with the congestion-problem on their own. This will eventually increase 
the expected degree of congestion and thus prevent a (possibly life-saving) evacuation. In the model 
we deal mainly with the first type of trust but treat congestion as an intensification of the evacuation 
problem. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. After a brief outline of the related literature in 
section 2, we present the early warning or information system in section 3 and the decision-model and 
communication-game in section 4. In section 5, we derive the model’s results, in particular the Nash-
Equilibrium of the compliance-game. In section 6 we give a brief summary and discuss the implications 
and possible extensions of our approach.  
2. Related literature and state of the art 
This section gives a brief overview on the relevant literature in this field. We start with some stylized 
facts about EWS and refer to selected case studies, which looked at specific challenges such as 
information processing, information aggregation, information communication as well as coordination 
between experts, such as services for flood control, who bear a large part of the responsibility for the 
public when making proficient use out of this information. The second part refers to literature on 
evacuation decision making and evacuation compliance. Although slightly dominated by social 
scientists this is a very interdisciplinary area of research, which comprise empirical studies, simulation 
models and guidelines.  
Literature on EWS and in particular models, which aim at improved forecasts, abound. An EWS belongs 
to the so-called non-structural measures of hazard protection (as compared to structural measures, 
such as dams or levees in the case of flood, which constitute a physical barrier). According to Salit et 
al. (2013) and Mileti & Sorensen (1990), an EWS for flood risk comprises three basic components: “the 
detection system (collection and analysis of information, flood forecasting), the management system 
(composed of national and local emergency management officials) and the response system 
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(transmission and reception of warnings to the population concerned)” (Salit et al. 2013). With respect 
to the last there is again a long list of requirements concerning the interface between sender and 
receiver of the message. These requirements refer to issuance and dissemination (outreach), 
perception, comprehension and interpretation, personalization (anticipating the receiver’s 
interpretation as people contextualize the information for themselves and ask questions such as: What 
does this message mean to me? Do I need further information?) and sender credibility. Warnings must 
be perceivable and clear (Sorensen 2000) and an EWS has to be adopted to the local conditions (Salit 
et al. (2013).  
Although floods and hurricanes are easier to predict than e.g. earthquakes, there are numerous 
examples of wrong forecasts also for these two types of events. The difficulty with hurricanes is that 
they can change their direction shortly before landfall. A well-known example is hurricane Rita in the 
Gulf of Mexico in the year 2005: “Although originally projected to hit the Houston/Galveston area, Rita 
took an easterly turn while still in the Gulf, a shift in direction that spared these metropolitan areas a 
direct hit” (Carpender et al. 2006, p. 777). There is a comparable level of uncertainty for floods as the 
movement of water masses, which break their path through inhabited districts, can be highly dynamic 
and therefore difficult to predict (Salit et al. 2013).  
With respect to the subtopic evacuation and evacuation decisions, research over the last two decades 
has constantly shifted towards a stronger focus on risk communication and people’s reactions to the 
combined events of an upcoming hazard and an evacuation order. From a practical perspective, there 
are guidelines such as the MEND-guide for humanitarian interventions who provide useful orientation 
for decision makers (Goldschmidt et al. 2014). In natural disasters all around the world the number of 
fatalities among those who did not evacuate in time is still remarkable. Therefore, research focused 
on the guiding question which group of people typically don’t evacuate in time, which are their 
characteristics and what can be done to influence their decision in an effective way. Basically, there 
are two main strands of literature: empirical case studies and evacuation simulation models. The 
former looks at specific events in a specific country and runs post-event surveys to understand people’s 
perceptions and motivations. Among the key insights is that personal risk perception plays an 
influential role in the evacuation decision (Dash & Gladwin 2007), that people tend to “hedge” their 
risk in the sense that they collect information from different sources, cross-check information and tend 
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to wait for a clearer picture unless they are fully convinced. A special focus lies on vulnerable groups 
with restricted mobility but also those who are socially vulnerable, such as marginalized groups.  
With respect to government communication in general and evacuation orders in particular, the impact 
of the official nature of an evacuation order on people’s decisions seems to be quite differentiated. 
Basically, people trust public authorities, they trust local authorities more than central government, 
they show a higher willingness to follow government orders even if this is in conflict with family’s/peers 
recommendation and they closely screen the authority’s credibility.  
For the context of evacuation decisions, evacuation compliance, acceptance and trust in public 
authorities and government agencies was subject to quite a number of contributions. The two main 
strands of literature focus on intention-based and credibility-based trust. People can doubt the 
intention of public officials if they feel that the government abuses the event as a pretext for the 
pursuit of other goals or that different groups of stakeholders (other than the directly affected 
population, such as tourists, investors, voters etc.) are the true addressees of a consequential measure. 
Although we do not focus on intention-based trust, we nevertheless take explicitly potential conflicts 
of interests into account. In our model, the government can pursue different objectives. While saving 
lives and protecting the population from injuries is the government’s primary objective, there are also 
secondary objectives, which can be “added to” the primary one by assigning weights and thus 
influencing the final decision. Secondary goals can also focus on the population to prevent nuisance or 
even deprivation caused by an evacuation. Alternatively, secondary goals can focus on the prevention 
of economic losses in the affected region. The Corona-crisis 2020 illustrates in a very evident way that 
the trade-off between impairments of the population and economic losses must not be ignored. 
With respect to credibility-based trust, the impact of false alarms is a frequently studied topic. The 
problem that people cease to take a warning seriously, if they experienced a false alarm is known as 
the Crying Wolf-phenomenon (Roulston & Smith 2004). Although it is difficult to empirically analyze 
the effects of sequential observations if the events at question are very rare, there were some 
occasions, which can shed some light into this issue. Studies find a rather modest effect of the Crying 
Wolf-phenomenon indicating that false alarms don’t exert a crushing effect on the sender’s credibility 
but rather shift some weight moderately into the direction of other information sources. Hence, 
people learn that they should not trust entirely the public announcements although they are still 
willing to trust to a sufficient degree.  
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To the best of our knowledge, competence trust and compliance as conceptualized in this paper have 
not yet been under study in the context of evacuation modelling. Regarding competence trust, the 
idea that people hold their own belief about the severity of a risk is close to approaches dealing with 
subjective risk perception (SRP). In SRP, the salience of communicated risk depends, among other 
factors, on the credibility of the source (e.g. media, government), which in turn leads to changes of 
subjective probabilities (Lindell & Prater 2002). However, our approach assumes objective risk 
perception, i.e. there are neither information asymmetries nor (preference-based) distortions of the 
event probabilities. In our model, we assume an information asymmetry between government and 
public regarding the impact of a potential flood. If people trust the government’s competence 
regarding the impact assessment, they interpret an evacuation-order (and equally a remain-order) as 
an indicator of the (partially) unknown future impact. 
The account of simulation models takes a formal approach and models evacuation decisions with a 
strong focus on congestion (Santos & Aguirre 2004). For example, Teo et al. (2015) present an agent-
based evacuation model; their model also incorporates government advice. However, the task of the 
government is to find the optimal assignment of people to avoid congestion. 
In our model, we deal with the problem of congestion in a rather different way. We neither focus on a 
routing model, nor do we solve a problem of pure coordination. Instead, congestion represents a 
further bottleneck, which can be effectively influenced by the government as a third party and which 
can influence the public’s incentives for evacuation via the trust channel. With respect to cost-benefit-
analyses in the context of forecasting models, our approach is akin to the classic Quickest Change 
Detection (QCD) problem (Li 2012). A QCD-problem distinguishes between two states (“regimes”) of a 
system. These are two conditions of which one is harmless but the other is problematic and should 
therefore be avoided. For example, an economy can be on its way into a recession or just experience 
a random and transient decline in output. Or a patient can show symptoms which indicate an infection 
but which can also just be due to other factors. The first, problematic, reason requires a more 
comprehensive and also more painful therapy than the second. The decision maker’s task is then to 
detect the switch to the problematic regime as fast as possible. A QCD-problem is a dynamic setting 
where time approaches a fixed terminal date. In our approach, timing is not relevant for the decision 




3. Problem structure and information system 
This section describes the statistical part of the model, the Information System (IS).  
3.1 The information (“warning”) system 
The basic structure of the problem, in particular the randomness and sequence of events, follows the 
properties of a Hidden-Markov-Model (HMM). Markov-models are stochastic automata, which share 
the property that future developments just depend on the current state and not from preceding states. 
A Markov-model is characterized by stochastic transitions between states, which are characterized by 
transition probabilities. In a HMM, the decision maker cannot directly observe the states but receives 
a signal (“omission”) which makes inferences about the true state possible (Zucchini & MacDonald 
2009). Figure 2 represents the three-state, first-order HHM for the decision problem described in the 
introduction. 
 
Figure 2. Hidden-Markov-Chain 
There are nine possible transitions between the three states. The initial state is S0, which corresponds 
to the situation where either no or just a harmless flood occurs. The state S1 represents a severe flood, 
which affects just the coastal region (the “risk zone” A) and the state S2 stands for an extreme flood 
with extraordinary water-levels affecting the whole town (regions A and B). The transition from state 
i to state j is depicted by the variable ijs . Starting from S0, three transitions to the state in the next 
period are possible: Either we remain in S0 (this corresponds to transition 00s ), which is the most 
probable transition, or we are hit by a flood event and end up in state S1 (
01s ) or even in state S2 ( 02s ). 
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According to Figure 2, every state is reachable from any other state, which is a realistic model of natural 
disaster events. For example in the case of a tsunami or a hurricane, which can rapidly change its 
direction, the direct transition s02 would be highly relevant whereas for floods, which develop over 
time (depending on precipitation, the confluence of rivers etc.), also the other two sequences {s01 , s12} 
are plausible. In general, a probability of occurrence refers to 1 year and to a pre-defined area. It is 
usual that intensity and frequency are mapped on the same scale so that events of extraordinary 
intensity are also extraordinarily rare. This is why the frequency of a flood (e.g. a 100-year flood) is 
used as a proxy for severeness. Most risk-metrics for natural disasters are just restricted to the 
meteorological or geophysical factors and thus provide information about the occurrence of an 
extreme weather event or specific constellations thereof. However, in general these metrics do not 
include information about the vulnerability of the specific location. Recently so-called impact forecasts 
are increasingly coming into focus, which do not only answer the question “What is the weather?” but 
also “What is the weather doing?” (Merz et al. 2020). Our probabilities are best understood as joint 
event and impact forecasts. 
We term state S0 the escalation-state because the two transitions leaving S0 move towards the 
dangerous states S1 and S2. In the escalation-state S0, the decision-maker has to decide whether to 
order evacuation for (at least one of) the groups or not. State S2 represents the opposite case, the de-
escalation-state. As described above, in S2 just return-decisions have to be made. In the diagram, the 
arrows in the opposite direction, indicating the “way back to normal”, consider the de-escalation 
phases. Finally, we call state S1 the mixed state, because it comprises both escalation and de-
escalation. All available transitions can alternatively depicted in a more efficient way as a Transition-
Matrix S (Table 1). If a Markov chain is ergodic, a property which will be fulfilled for the numerical 
applications of our model, it has a unique stationary distribution, which can be determined by solving 
the equation 
T =S , where ( )0 1 2, ,
T
   = . The resulting distribution *  tells us the “average” 
probability for each state (S0, S1 or S2), which remains unchanged when time progresses (Zucchini & 
MacDonald 2009). 
We now turn to the main part of the information system as illustrated in Table 1. The grey variables in 
brackets indicate the warnings, which are available one period before the forecasted event occurs. The 
variable ik  reads as “the (warning) signal received in state i predicts state k as the state of the next 
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period”. For flood, the time between two events could be between 12 and 24 hours; in the last case 
the warning represents a classic day-ahead forecast. 
The warning signal ik is a discrete, trinary random variable  0,1,2ik  , which is sufficiently 
informative in a sense described below. The quality or precision of the information system is described 
by the conditional probability ( | )ik ijq s , which is the probability that a warning signal predicts the 
transition from the current state i to the future state k given that the true future state is j. The so-
called Likelihood-Matrix L (Table 1) summarizes all constellations for this conditional probability. It is 
straightforward that the rows of this matrix add up to 1.  
Table 1: Transition matrix and Likelihood-Matrix 
 
 
    (1) 
For the information system to be sufficiently informative, it is required that the warning signals display 
a minimal degree of precision with respect to the state of nature they predict. In concrete terms, we 
impose the following Informativeness-Condition (IC) on the information system (expression (2)). 
Informativeness-Condition (IC):  ( | ) ( | )ij ij i j ijq s q s  −         (2) 
Assume the transition ijs , i.e. the true future state is state j. Then the warning should have higher 
probability to signal state j than to signal any other state –j. If IC is fulfilled, the information-system is 
valuable or useful for the decision maker in the sense that it generates “better than random” results, 
which is an empirically correct assumption regarding the forecasting precision of EWS in practice. 
Both, the prior transition probabilities and the Likelihood-Matrix are common knowledge of all 
decision makers of our setting: the (local) government G and the populations of the two regions, which 
we term group A and group B. In each period, all actors know the current state, the issued warning 
signal with respect to the next state (both pieces of information are summarized in the variable ik ) 
and the Likelihood-Matrix. The warning signal is issued e.g. by a weather forecasting service and is 
therefore publicly observable. With this information, the DMs can calculate the up-dated posteriori-
probability according to Bayes’ Theorem 
( | )
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for a given state i, we combine S and L and thus derive the conditional Posterior-Matrix P according 
to expression (3).   
 
 (3) 
3.2 Rough calibration based on minimal assumptions  
Although this model serves mainly analytical purposes to understand the basic factors of interactive 
decision making on theoretical grounds, we nevertheless strive to achieve a rough calibration and put 
the model into an empirically plausible “frame”. Throughout this paper we use two types of calibration. 
We use a set of simple and arbitrary numbers as parameter values if our main purpose is to show the 
main mechanism of the model, how it works and to illustrate a comprehensive range of potential 
solutions. We call these parameter values “arbitrary numbers”. With respect to model validation, we 
apply (and partly adjust) parameter values where we could find some reference or benchmark data. 
We call this set of numbers “hypothetical data” and apply it where we want to illustrate, for example, 
which of the derived solutions comes closest to a real world-setting.  
Now, what is the data availability with respect to the parameters of an information system as described 
in Section 3.1? First, it is needless to say that EWS are complex and specific tools with still a very low 
level of standardization for data generation and data sharing. Although many EWS use probabilistic 
forecasting and apply Bayesian tools, which makes them to a minimum degree compatible to our 
approach, unfortunately there are no databases existing which could be used for parametrization. 
However, at least for an escalation to scenario S1 of an extreme flood, i.e. for the transition 
01s , there 
are some insights from the European Flood Awareness System about the expected frequency of severe 
coastal inundation (Merz et al. 2020, p. 16). A flood, which heavily affects the coastal residents roughly 
corresponds to a frequency of 20 to 80 years, depending on geological and geographical factors of the 
built environment, the technical resilience of the region and the flood protection measures. As our 
model takes vulnerability as given, we take a 50-year-flood as a plausible case, which corresponds to 
an expected rate of occurrence of 2% per year and 0.0055% per day respectively. For the case of an 
extreme flood it is even more difficult to identify a good proxy for at least two reasons. First, there is 
less experience and data with extreme events and second, very extreme floods result from more 
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complex hazard scenarios. Most frequently, they can be caused by meteorological compound events 
of severe convective storms, marine gusts and long periods of heavy precipitation. In addition, 
hurricanes can cause extreme floods and one of the most deterrent candidates are Tsunamis. EWS for 
Tsunamis determine the earliest arrivals, the time of arrival, the wave amplitude and the propagation 
of a tsunami (Chaturvedi et al. 2017, p. 84). For such very extreme events, the range lies between 200 
and 1.000 years but even reaches up to 10.000 years. The latter number refers to a flood protection 
exercise in the Netherlands, executed by the Task Force for Flood Event Management (FLOODsite, p. 
115). We again take a medium value as an average guess and take a 500-year flood (daily event 
probability of 0.00055%) as an appropriate proxy. Hence, the first row of the transition-matrix gets the 
entries 0.99993950, 0.0000550 and 0.0000055 (see Figure 4). For transitions starting in state S1 and 
S2, it is not possible to extract benchmark numbers from literature or flood reports because the further 
worsening of an already bad situation (transition 
12s ) is usually not registered as a separate event. In 
addition, the warning process during a de-escalation is partly different from an escalation because a 
warning system has to fall below a certain threshold before the alarm is deactivated and the region is 
declared safe again. Hence, although it is important to understand the interactions and dynamics of 
the de-escalation events, too, evidence is scarce. For this reason we filled the rest of the Transition-
Matrix together with two flood experts, taking the warning bias (threshold-deactivation of the EWS) 
into consideration. The left matrix in expression (4) shows the calibrated Transition-Matrix S. For these 
values, we get ( )0 1 2* 99.9797%, 0.0167861%, 0.00347298%   = = = =  as the stationary 
distribution of the Markov Model.          
 
(4) 
In the next step we look for empirical values of the Likelihood-Matrix, i.e. data which tells us something 
about the precision and effectiveness of flood-EWS, also called EWS-verification. In verification of 
weather warning, most approaches apply contingency tables and corresponding scores, as e.g. the 
equitable threat score (ETS) in UK and a combination of ETS, the probability of detection (POD), the 
false alarm ratio (FAR) together with the frequency bias is used in Austria (Wilson 2018, Wilson & Giles 
2013). The most advantageous account was provided by Wilson & Giles (2013). The authors evaluated 
contingency-table data between 2009 and 2011 of a Canadian flood-EWS in order to arrive at an 
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improved warning index. For a severe flood-event they derive a HIT-rate of 75% and a False-Alarm (FA)-
rate of 2%. For an extreme flood the EWS-precision is lower according to the literature. Although, for 
example, nearly all tsunamis can be detected by modern EWS, there is uncertainty about under- and 
overestimating the wave height and the exact localization. Here the uncertainty can be considerable 
with fluctuations between 30-50% (Lauterjung & Letz, 2017, p. 41). Therefore we consider this 
uncertainty and adjust for noise. We assume a HIT-rate of 60% and a FA-rate of 6% for S2. We use 
these values for our study but have to adjust the calculation because our setting considers three states 
(including warning states). Matrix L (matrix with letter-entries in the middle of expression (4)) 
represents a general Likelihood-Matrix which helps to understand the calculations. The HIT-rate for 
state S1 is calculated by taking the HITS (cells e + f + h + m) and divide them by HITS and misses (cells 
d + g). For state S2 we have the same procedure but different cells are relevant, here we have m divided 
by (m + g + h). The FA-rates are the ratio of the false alarms in the numerator and the false alarms 
together with the “correct negatives” in the denominator. This corresponds to the ratios (b + c)/(a + b 
+ c) for S1 and (c + f)/(a + b + c + d + e + f) for S2. We further have to consider the Informativeness-
Condition (IC), which requires a > b > c, m > h > g, e > d and e > f. The right part of expression (4) shows 
all entries of the matrix 0L , which fulfill the ensemble of the before mentioned conditions. The 
likelihood-matrices for the mixed-scenario (S1) and the de-escalation-scenario (S2) could not be 
derived in a similarly precise way. Here again we took 0L as anchor and consulted the two flood 
experts. The resulting matrices are shown in expression (5). 
 
(5) 
Expressions (4) and (5) comprise the “hypothetical dataset” for the IS-validation. By applying Bayes’ 
rule we get the corresponding conditional Posterior-Matrices 0P , 1P  and 2P as given by expression (6).  
 
(6) 
Altogether, these numbers are oriented at real EWS-data reflecting current performance of an EWS 
for (coastal) flood risk without imposing too many restrictions, which otherwise bear the risk to be 
unjustified on empirical grounds. In the first place, this model provides the formal “infrastructure” for 
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an analysis and if transferred to a concrete context, assumptions can be fine-tuned towards the specific 
forecasting technology and data basis as illustrated by the reference above. 
4. Decision Model 
In this section, we briefly describe the objective functions and strategies of the local government G 
and the citizens of the two regions A and B. For the ease of exposition, we talk about “group A” and 
“group B” and an objective function reflects the (dis)utility of one representative member of each 
group. As all objective functions are scenario-dependent, for each type of decision maker we have an 
objective function for the escalation-state (S0), the mixed-state (S1) and the de-escalation state (S2). 
In the model, we express all types of payoffs in disutility-units, such as damage, deprivation and 
economic loss. Therefore, the resulting objective functions are cost functions, where the term “cost” 
is just shorthand for disutility reflecting different forms of negative consequences for the individuals. 
In each state, the groups and the local government G observe the warning signal ꙍik, update the priors 
accordingly and make their respective decision. For the description of the model structure but even 
for the derivation of the equilibrium conditions it is not necessary to take the warning-levels explicitly 
into consideration. Therefore, for the most part of this section, we suppress the warning-level k in the 
notation and just use the short form ijp  to describe the conditional probabilities ( | )ij ij ikp p s   of a 
transition to state j given the current state i and “any” warning-level k. This way, the analysis is more 
general but also more comprehensible. Later, we evaluate the ijp -values for different warning-levels.  
4.1 Decision variables, payoff parameters and trust variables 
Decision variables 
The discrete, binary decision variable {0,1}Av  for group A (and Bv  for group B respectively) 
describes the decision of a representative member of group A. The choice , 1A Bv =  always represents 
the cautious option of the decision, which is “evacuation” in the escalation-state and “stay evacuated” 
in the de-escalation-state. Accordingly, , 0A Bv =  represents the risky option of a decision 
corresponding to “no evacuation” in the escalation-state and “return home” in the de-escalation-state. 
While both groups choose an action strategy, the government G chooses a communication strategy. 
In particular, G picks one out of three types of requests { }E E0,E1,E2 . The request E0 is equivalent to 
the message “no evacuation necessary in both regions” in the escalation-state and “return to both 
regions is possible” in the de-escalation-state. Although G has a trinary strategy set, each group 
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receives a binary signal 
, {0,1}A BE  . For request E0, the received signals are identical ( 0, 0)A BE E= =  
because the order is the same for both groups. Request E1 is equivalent to the message “evacuation 
in region A but no evacuation necessary in region B” in the escalation-state and to “stay evacuated in 
region A but return to region B is possible” in the de-escalation-state. Hence, request E1 generates the 
signals ( 1, 0)A BE E= = . Finally, request E2 corresponds to the message “evacuation in both regions” 
in the escalation-state and “stay evacuated in both regions” in the de-escalation-state. By observing 
the request E2, each group receives the same signal ( 1, 1)A BE E= = . Note that there is no possibility 
for the signal-combination ( 0, 1)A BE E= =  because this would imply a contradiction (if evacuation is 
ordered to the whole town, this automatically includes group A, too).   
The described communication strategies of the government include both active and passive 
communication. With respect to the request E1, the government has to take into consideration that 
the very same message has different content for each group, i.e. the signals vary. However, as the 
analysis in section 5 shows, even an identical signal (as in the case of the requests E0 and E2) can cause 
different reactions by the two groups because their risk situation is different. 
Payoffs 
With respect to the disutility of the citizens, we distinguish three types of cost. The most important 
cost component is D, which is relevant if a person is hit by a flood. It represents potential death and 
injury or strong deprivation (in the case of lack of food, water, medicine). The other two cost 
components refer to the cost of evacuation and capture the inconvenience, nuisance or deprivation 
with less relevance for health. The parameter 
mc  reflects the direct cost of the evacuation itself (“cost 
for moving”, therefore the index m) and 
dc  reflects the deprivation of one evacuated period. This cost 
term takes into account the fact that those affected by an evacuation are exposed to a particularly 
difficult and stressful situation together with the nuisance that the normal course of everyday life is 
disrupted. The superscript d therefore stands for either deprivation or disruption. We assume a clear-
cut order of the cost-components 0 m dc c D   . 
The government takes the before mentioned disutility-components into account, too. In addition, G 
cares for two types of economic losses. The loss-parameter L  reflects the economic opportunity cost 
of an unjustified evacuation due to foregone business revenues in the region. The loss parameter H  
captures the loss of human capital if people are hit by a flood. In addition to the direct physical damage 
D, affected people are either not available or not productive for a time span after the flood because 
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they are in hospitals, suffer at home from injuries or psychical stress or they have to care for their 
peers. Note that all cost components refer to one period (the focal period of planning) except the 
human-capital-loss, which reflects a medium-term future loss. To consider this difference, we add a 
discount factor 0 1   to the human capital-loss component. The superscripts L and H stand for 
“low” and “high”, which should help to order the cost components visually. We assume 
0 L H D   . 
Direct evacuation cost are not included in the government’s decision because civil protection is the 
primary task of the local government. In addition, there are often soft budget constraints for disaster 
situations. Extra funds are made available by the central government because policy makers, and in 
particular their voters, will not tolerate a high death toll. However, budget issues always play a role 
and in the context of disasters, they most probably affect future decisions. As done in section 3, we 
also want to roughly calibrate these five cost components to get an approximate order of magnitude. 
The values used as a basis are provided by Table 2. 
Table 2. Calibration of cost parameters 
Variable Value [€] Description 
D  65 10     Value of Statistical Life (VSL); Viscusi & Aldy (2003) 
mc  21.6 10     Lost net value of production (day); Schröter et al. (2008) 
dc  32.5 10     Lost net value of production x deprivation factor 
L  
31.25 10     Lost net value of production (week); Schröter et al. (2008) 
H  
45 10     Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY); Cropper & Sahin (2009) 
 
Expected flood impact  and competence trust in the government 
As already mentioned above, there is an information asymmetry between the government and the 
two groups with respect to the expected impact [0,1]  of a potential flood. Although there are 
event probabilities available, there can remain doubts whether and how severely even an extreme 
flood could harm and affect individuals (Dow & Cutter 2000). In the context of flood risk, people often 
wrongly estimate the speed and power of water flows, the effects of an impairment of critical 
infrastructure and the destabilizing impact of high water levels on buildings (which is why people often 
prefer sheltering in high buildings to evacuation). The expected impact of a flood as perceived by group 
A is given by ˆ(1 )
c c
A A A A AE   = + − ,  0,1A  . The variable [0,1]
c
A   reflects the competence 
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trust in the government’s impact assessment and the variable {0,1}AE   is the received binary signal, 
which directly results from G’s request as described above. The variable ˆ ( )A   is the independent 
belief of group A about the potential impact of a flood, which the individuals infer from the warning-
level  . The higher cA , the higher the willingness of group A to take the government’s request into 
account, i.e. to interpret the government’s request as credible information about flood risk (Basolo et 
al. 2009). The lower the trust parameter, the more weight is placed on the independent guess ˆ ( )A 
. In the special case of full trust ( 1
c
A = ), the expected impact equals the binary signal AE , i.e. 
A AE =  and  0,1A  . Note that a sufficiently high trust-level can either increase or reduce the 
motivation to evacuate (or to stay in the region if already evacuated), dependent on the type of 
request. In the opposite case of full distrust ( 0
c
A = ), the expected impact equals the independent 
belief ˆ( ( ))A A  = . As the independent belief ˆ ( )A   depends on the warning-level, we need 
further assumptions about this parameter. In the case of “no warning” ( 0 = ), the independent belief 
of both groups is zero ( ˆ ( 0)A  = = ˆ ( 0) 0A  = = ). In the case of a flood-warning for region A ( 1 =
) we assume an arbitrary value ˆ0 ( 1) 1A  =   for group A, which depends on prior flood experience 
and the risk expertise of the population. As we neither look at path dependent outcomes nor 
incorporate issues of risk experience and risk communication, we treat this variable as exogenous. 
From the perspective of group B, the impact is expected to be very low, indicated by the variable 
0 1  , which stands for a very low probability. Hence, ˆ0 ( 1) 1B   = =  . In the case of a 
level-2-warning ( 2 = ), group B expects an impact similar to the belief of group A for a level-1-
warning, ˆ0 ( 2) 1B  =  , and group A expects a “near to certain” strike based on the belief 
ˆ0 ( 2) 1A   = = − . If not otherwise stated, we make the assumption 
c c
A B  , which implies that 
the parameters for competence-trust of both groups are either identical or the trust-level of group A 
is higher because the people in the risk-zone expect that the government has a special focus on this 
region. 
Expected congestion (1 –  ) and reliability trust in the government 
The second type of trust considered in ECM is the government’s reliability with respect to evacuation 
preparation and congestion management. Let [0,1]  be a measure of evacuation effectivity, which 
is equal to zero if the roads are fully congested (in this case evacuation is impossible) and equal to one 
if there is no congestion at all. The complement (1 –  ) is then a measure of congestion. Depending 
on whether one group or both groups leave the region at the same time, there is congestion to the 
21 
 
extent of 1 (1 )A Bv v  − = + − . The government has the possibility to mitigate the congestion 
problem by an investment [0,1]I   into improved evacuation planning and emergency logistics, 
1 [ (1 ) ] (1 )A Bv v I  − = + − − . These measures comprise e.g. very detailed scenario planning, 
evacuation training with employees, special contracts with bus companies or even rent contracts to 
have helicopters available. We assume that this investment, i.e. the complete package of measures, is 
not observable to the public. A full investment, 1I = , stands for a perfect preparation-level, which can 
reduce the congestion-problem completely. No investment, 0I = , as the other extreme, implies that 
G has done absolutely nothing to improve the situation. In this case, the groups turn in on themselves. 
The required budget for an investment-level I  is given by ( ) [1 ]B I Log I= − − . This function implies 
( 0) 0B I = =  and ( 1)B I = =  , i.e. the perfect preparation-level comes at an infinitively high cost. 
As the public cannot observe the investment-level, both groups need to trust the government to have 
taken the necessary precautions (Hamm et al. 2019). The trust-parameter for reliability trust [0,1]
r   
is assumed identical for both groups. Hence, from the perspective of both groups, the expected 
evacuation effectivity is given by 1 [ (1 ) ] (1 )
r
A Bv v   = − + − − .  
4.2 Cost functions of group A and B 
Escalation-scenario S0 
The cost-functions for both strategies of group A and S0 are given by the expressions (7) and (8). 
( ) ( ) ( )( )0 00 01 02( 1) 2 (1 ) 1 (1 )S m d m dA A A A A AC v p c c p p c D c   = = + + + + − + − −   (7) 
( )0 01 02( 0)
S
A A AC v p p D= = +         (8) 
If group A evacuates ( 1Av = ) although the evacuation is unnecessary (to be expected with probability 
00p ), the group incurs twice the moving-cost 
mc  (the group moves out of the region but returns when 
the false alarm is realized) and once the cost for evacuation-deprivation 
dc . These two cost-elements 
are not involved in the case of no evacuation ( 0Av = ). When the group evacuates and the region is 
hit by a flood (to be expected with probability 
01 02p p+ ), it incurs the moving-cost and either physical 
damage 
AD , if evacuation fails due to congestion (determined by 1 A− ), or the evacuation-cost 
dc , if the evacuation can be executed without congestion (to be expected with probability A ). If the 
group does not evacuate but a flood occurs, the group suffers from the high damage cost. Note that 
the value of the damage cost depends on the expected impact because we look at the problem from 
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the group’s perspective. The cost functions for group B in scenario S0 look nearly identical (9), the only 
difference is that group B is not affected by a flood in region A (expected with probability 
01p ), which 
implies a lower risk of damage but a higher risk of unnecessary evacuation.      




B B AC v p D= =          (10) 
Mixed-scenario S1 
In the de-escalation-state S1, region A is already flooded and the citizens are no longer there: Either 
they evacuated in a controlled manner (depending on their evacuation-strategy in S0) or the flood 
“forced” them out of the region. In this case, they had to hastily abandon their homes, had to be saved 
by rescue services or did not survive. The following cost functions, as depicted by (11) and (12), are 
therefore only relevant for those in group A who were able to leave the region unharmed and are now 
waiting to return. Remember that in a de-escalation-state the strategy 1v =  corresponds to “stay 
evacuated” and 0v =  means “return home”.  
1( 1)S dA AC v c= =           (11) 
( )1 01 02( 0)
S m
A A AC v c p p D= = + +         (12) 
If group A stays evacuated it suffers from evacuation-deprivation 
dc . If A returns, it incurs the cost for 
moving back, 
mc , and risks to be hit a second time by a returning flood (“second wave”). We don’t 
consider congestion for the way back because there is less rush and – what is more important – if 
people get stuck on their way back they are still in a safe area. The cost functions of group B are the 
same as in scenario S0 because also in S1 region B is not flooded. 
De-escalation-scenario S2 
In S2, both groups face a de-escalation scenario. The cost-functions for A are the same as in S1 and 
those for group B, expressions (13) and (14), are equivalent. 









4.3 Social cost function of the government G 
In the ECM, the government has the role of a policy-maker who seeks to minimize the social cost. 
Basically, the “ingredients” to the social cost function are similar to the cost functions of both groups 
with mainly three differences. First, the government cannot decide about evacuation due to the strict 
no-enforcement-assumption. However, G seeks to optimally influence the groups’ decisions by its 
communication-strategy E  and this requires that G needs to know the parameter constellations for 
which no, partial or full evacuation is socially optimal. Second, the government communicates E  to 
both groups at the same time; therefore the social cost function is an average of the outcomes in both 
regions, weighted by the population share  . Third, G puts weight [0,1]  on the population’s 
deprivation (caused by an evacuation) but also weight [0,1]   on the economic losses. Hence, for 
1 =  and 0 = , the groups objectives and the government’s objectives come closest (although they 
are still not identical due to the information asymmetries). The physical damage parameter D  has an 
explicit weight of 1, however the implicit weight of D of course depends on  and . Fourth, the 
government has full information on the trust-sensitive parameters   and   as G knows the expected 
impact ( 1 = ) and its own investment I  into congestion reduction. The last parameter, which is 
specific to G’s decision, refers to the de-escalation-scenario.  
Escalation-scenario S0 
( )( )0 00 (1 ) (2 ) ...S m d LG A BC p v v c c    = + − + + +   
( )01 02( ) (1 )( ) ( ) (1 )( ) ...H m m d HA Ap p v D c c c v D        + + − + + + + + − + +   
( )01(1 ) (2 ) ...m d LBp v c c   + − + + +   
 ( )02 (1 ) (1 )( ) ( ) (1 )( )H m m d HB Bp v D c c c v D        + − − + + + + + − +       (15) 
The first two summands refer to group A (weighted by  ), the last two summands refer to group B 
(weighted by 1 − ). In the case that an evacuation is unnecessary, the economic opportunity cost 
L occurs as an additional factor and if a necessary evacuation has not taken place – either due to 
congestion or due to a wrong decision) the medium-term cost H come on top of D  (both loss 




Mixed-scenario S1 and De-escalation-scenario S2 
For the social cost-functions in S1 (but also for S2 below), there appears one further parameter in the 
de-escalation-scenario. Suppose that group A was already affected by a flood and now has to decide 
whether to return. The return-decision can just be made by those who successfully evacuated, hence 




 percent of the population of group A. The time-index 1t −  indicates that the share 
of people who make the return-decision depends on both, the evacuation strategy and the evacuation-






 result endogenously from the equilibrium 
evacuation-strategies as well as from the equilibrium congestion-rate (see section 5). Apart from this 
detail, the social cost functions for scenario S1 and S2 are straightforward. 
( )1 110 ( ) (1 ) ...S t d L mG A A AC p v c v c    −= + + − +  
( )111 12( ) (1 )( ) ...t d H mA A Ap p v c v D c     −+ + + − + + +  
( )10 11( )(1 ) (2 ) ...m d LBp p v c c   + + − + + +   
 ( )12 (1 ) (1 )( ) ( ) (1 )( )H m m d HB Bp v D c c c v D        + − − + + + + + − +        (16) 
( )2 120 ( ) (1 ) ...S t d L mG A A AC p v c v c    −= + + − +  
( )121 22( ) (1 )( ) ...t d H mA A Ap p v c v D c     −+ + + − + + +  
( )120 21( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ...t d L mB B Bp p v c v c    −+ + − + + − +  
 ( )122 (1 ) (1 )( )t d H mB B Bp v c v D c     −+ − + − + +         (17) 
 
5. Equilibrium analysis and game results 
In this section, we derive the Nash-Equilibria (NE) of the Stackelberg-game for the scenarios S0, S1 and 
S2. We restrict the analysis on pure equilibria and solve the game by backward-induction, starting with 
the sub-equilibrium on stage 2 (group-interactions) and moving forward to stage 1 to identify the 
optimal evacuation-order of the government. The optimal government’s investment decision (stage 0) 
will be derived in section 6. 
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In the escalation-scenario S0, both groups play a subgame on stage 2 because the groups influence 
each other via the evacuation-effectiveness parameter [0,1] , which is defined by expression (18). 
Note that although each group forms an ex ante belief about this parameter ( A and B  respectively), 
in equilibrium there results just one level of evacuation-effectiveness for the whole city.  
( ), 1 (1 ) (1 )A Bv v A Bv v y  = − + − −             (18) 
According to expression (18), for 0y =  evacuation-effectiveness is partially reduced to 1,0 if just 
group A decides to evacuate ( 1Av =  and 0Bv = ) and it is fully reduced to 1,1  if both groups evacuate 
( 1Av =  and 0Bv = ). As we assume 0 0.5  , there will be less people in the street if group A 
evacuates compared to group B. Hence, 1,1 0,1 1,00 1      . As already described above, by 
investing a share  0,1y  of a given budget in improving the traffic conditions, the government can 
reduce congestion. As the citizens cannot observe the investment they form a belief ,
r
A B  about it, 
which reflects the public’s trust in G’s reliability.  
In a first step we ignore the concrete warning-level and derive a general solution for each of the three 
situations S0, S1 and S2. The last requirements, 
0 1 20 , , 1i i ip p p   and 0 1 2 1i i ip p p+ + = , are both 
straightforward and were already prescribed by section 3. Without loss of generality, we henceforth 
substitute 0ip  according to 0 1 21i i ip p p= − − . 
 
Figure 3. Game structure and sequence of events 
 
5.1 Optimal strategies in the Escalation-Scenario S0 
Optimal group strategies 




A BT  , which constitute critical thresholds for the conditional 
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A B BT T T  . 
Proof: The order can be easily verified by taking into consideration the parameter assumptions made 
above: 1,1 0,1 1,00 1      , 010 1p  , ˆ ˆB A   and 
c c
A B  . 
We can then state the following Proposition 1a. 
Proposition 1a (Group-Equilibrium in S0) 
The group-equilibrium of the sub-game on stage 2 for scenario S0 is given by 
( )* *0, 0A Bv v= =  if 002 1SAp T ;          (22) 
( )* *1, 0A Bv v= =  if 0 01 02 2S SA BT p T  ;         (23) 
( )* *0, 0A Bv v= =  if 02 02SBT p           (24) 
Proof: For ( 0, 0)A Bv v= =  to be a NE, two conditions (I) 
0 0( 0, 0) ( 1, 0)S SA A B A A BC v v C v v= =  = =  
and (II) 
0 0( 0, 0) ( 0, 1)S SB A B B A BC v v C v v= =  = = must be fulfilled. In words, both groups must 
strictly prefer not to evacuate provided that the other group sticks to the no-evacuation-strategy, too. 
For each condition, there is a critical threshold for 








Bp T . Hence, a NE 
where no group evacuates requires 
0 0
02 1 01 1[ , ]
S S


















BT but not vice versa). Hence, if group A does not evacuate, then group B certainly does not 
either. 
For ( 1, 0)A Bv v= =  to be a NE, two conditions (III) 
0 0( 1, 0) ( 0, 0)S SA A B A A BC v v C v v= =  = =  and 
(IV) 
0 0( 1, 0) ( 1, 1)S SB A B B A BC v v C v v= =  = = must be fulfilled. Under this condition, group A must 
strictly prefer to evacuate given that group B does not and group B should not prefer to evacuate given 
that group A does. Again there result two conditions, constituting a critical threshold for 
02p . The first 








A BT T  
is a necessary condition for the existence of a NE and according to Lemma 1a, this condition holds true. 
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The strategy-combination ( 1, 1)A Bv v= =  is a NE if the conditions (V) 
0 0( 1, 1) ( 0, 1)S SA A B A A BC v v C v v= =  = =  and (VI) 
0 0( 1, 1) ( 1, 0)S SB A B B A BC v v C v v= =  = =  are 
fulfilled. Both groups prefer to evacuate, given that the other group does so, too. The second condition 




Ap T  
Hence, a NE for both groups evacuating requires 
0 0
1 2 02[ , ]
S S

















AT  anyway). 
Hence, if group B evacuates, then group A will certainly evacuate, too. This completes the proof of 
Proposition 1a.  
Optimal government strategies 
The optimal decisions of both groups on stage 2 are anticipated by G (the government), which tries to 
minimize the social cost by deciding about its communication-strategy E . The procedure comprises 
two steps: First, we derive the critical thresholds for which G prefers the outcomes “no evacuation”, 
“partial evacuation” and “full evacuation”. Second, once we know the government’s objectives, we 
derive the optimal communication-strategy of stage 1 of the Stackelberg-game. We first define two 
terms 





( ) ( )
m d L
S
G m d L H d
c c
T p
c c D c
 
    
+ +
 −
+ + + + −




( ) (1 ) (2 )
( ) (1 ) (2 )
H d m d L
S
G H d m d L
p D c c c
T
D c c c
       
       
   − + − + − + +   
   − + − + − + +   
   (26) 







G D c c
   








G GT T  applies. 
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
Proposition 1b defines the socially optimal strategy-combinations as envisaged by the government. To 
distinguish socially optimal strategies from individually optimal (Nash-equilibrium) strategies, we use 
a small circle ( ) as superscript.  
Proposition 1b (Optimal Government-Strategies in S0) 
( )0, 0A Bv v= =  if 002 10 SGp T  ;        (27) 
( )1, 0A Bv v= =  if 0 01 02 2S SG GT p T  ;        (28) 
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( )0, 0A Bv v= =  if 02 02SGT p          (29) 
Proof: If “no evacuation” of both groups ( 0, 0)A Bv v= =  minimizes the social cost-function, the social 
cost must be lower than in the two alternatives, (I) 
0 0( 0, 0) ( 1, 0)S SG A B G A BC v v C v v= =  = =  and (II) 

















GT p−  is the upper 
bound for 
02p  in (21). The government prefers that just group A evacuates ( 1, 0)A Bv v= =  if the 
following two inequalities hold: (III) 
0 0( 1, 0) ( 0, 0)S SG A B G A BC v v C v v= =  = =  and (IV) 
0 0( 1, 0) ( 1, 1)S SG A B G A BC v v C v v= =  = = . Inequality (III) is the inverse constellation to (I) and 








G GT T , therefore 02p  




Gp T  , joint 








GT as the lower bound for 02p . This completes the proof.  
5.2 Optimal strategies in the Mixed-Scenario S1 
Optimal group strategies 




A BT  , which constitute critical thresholds for the conditional 
probability 


























         (31) 
In situation S1, congestion is no longer a strategic issue between the two groups and therefore their 
objective functions are not interdependent. Thus, we are left with just one critical threshold for each 
group. Note that the optimal group strategies in S1 and S2 do not constitute a Nash-equilibrium 
because these are independent optimal strategies. 
Lemma 2a:  1 1 110 1 0,1
S S
A BT T p      . 
Proof: We just sketch the proof by contradiction. As 
1S









A BT p T=  , B must exceed 
a lower bound 
1S
B . However, it is straightforward to show  
1 10, : 0 1S SB A B B BT         . 
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We then can state the following Proposition 2a. We skip the proof because it follows the same 
structure as for Proposition 1a. 
Proposition 2a (Group-strategies in S1) 
The optimal group-strategies for scenario S1 are given by 
( )* *0, 0A Bv v= =  if 112 SAp T          (32) 
( )* *1, 0A Bv v= =  if 1 112S SA BT p T           (33) 
( )* *0, 0A Bv v= =  if 1 12SBT p          (34) 
Optimal government strategies 
For the government we get the following two critical thresholds 
10 1SGT   for situation S1, as given 
by (35) and (36). 
1
1 11



















G m d L H d
c c
T
c c D c
 
    
+ +

+ + + + −
      (36) 




G GT T . 




GT  does not depend on 11p , it is sufficient to 
show that 
1 1
1 11 2( 0)
S S
G GT p T=  . In order to get the opposite result 
1 1
1 11 2( 0)
S S
G GT p T=  , 11 must exceed 
a lower bound 
1
11
S . However, for our assumptions any, value 111 11
S   will strictly exceed 1. We 
conclude   111 11 110,1 : 1
S      , which completes the proof. 
Proposition 2b defines the socially optimal strategy-combinations from the government’s perspective 
for situation S1. We skip the proof because it follows the same structure as for Proposition 1b. 
Proposition 2b (Optimal Government-Strategies in S1) 
( )0, 0A Bv v= =  if 112 10 SGp T  ;        (38) 
( )1, 0A Bv v= =  if 1 11 12 2S SG GT p T  ;        (39) 




5.3 Optimal strategies in the De-Escalation-Scenario S2 




A BT   constitute the critical thresholds for the 
conditional probability 
22p  in the de-escalation-state. In S2, both groups already evacuated. For group 
A the expression is identical to situation S1 and group B also makes the decision whether to stay 





















            (42) 
Due to B A    it is straightforward that 
2 2S S
A BT T . This brings us directly to Proposition 3a. 
Proposition 3a (Group-strategies in S2) 
The optimal group-strategies for scenario S2 are given by 
( )* *0, 0A Bv v= =  if 222 SAp T           (43) 
( )* *1, 0A Bv v= =  if 2 222S SA BT p T            (44) 
( )* *0, 0A Bv v= =  if 2 22SBT p           (45) 
Optimal government strategies 
For the government we get the following two critical thresholds 
20 1SGT   for situation S2, as given 
by (46) and (47). 
2 1
1 1 11
( )d m LS S









         (46) 
2
2










          (47) 
Proposition 3b defines the socially optimal strategy-combinations from the government’s perspective 
for situation S2.  
Proposition 3b (Optimal Government-Strategies in S2) 
( )0, 0A Bv v= =  if 222 10 SGp T  ;         (48) 
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( )1, 0A Bv v= =  if 2 21 22 2S SG GT p T  ;        (49) 
( )0, 0A Bv v= =  if 22 22SGT p          (50) 
5.4  Zones of Compliance (ZoC) 
Illustration in a probability triangle 
In this section we analyze the scope for compliance in the government’s interaction with both groups. 
For the main part of this subsection, we refer to the escalation-scenario S0. The left diagram of Figure 
4 shows the critical thresholds of both groups in S0 graphically in a probability triangle. The edges and 
the corner points of the triangle are highlighted in black. Any constellation of the conditional posterior 
probabilities, i.e. the discrete, conditional probability distribution  | 0 1 2: , ,s i i ip p p , can be marked 
in this triangle as a probability-point   with coordinates 
1 2( , )i ip p . The higher one of these 
probabilities, the closer it is to “its corner”. Assume for example that we are in state S0 and we receive 
“no warning” (
00 ). In this case, the first column of the conditional posterior matrix 0P  (6) applies and 
gives back the probability-point 
00 01 02( , , ) (0.999975,0.000024,0.000001)p p p = = . As the 
probability 00 01 021p p p − −  comes close to 1, this point would we drawn in the origin of ordinates.  
 
Figure 4. Probability triangle for optimal decisions, just groups (left) and with authority (right) 
We now just need to spot the conditional probability in the plane and can directly infer the decisions 













BT , which corresponds to the area “A”, just group A evacuates but group B does 




BT  in the upper corner “AB”. In this case, both 
groups prefer to evacuate. 
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In the right diagram of Figure 4 we added the critical thresholds of G as dotted lines. As both lines do 
not coincide with the groups‘ thresholds, there are constellations in which the groups and the 
government’s preferences deviate from each other. These zones of conflicting interest are highlighted 
in the diagram. In zone 0[2] G prefers that group A evacuates, which is not the preferred strategy of 
group A. There is the exact opposite constellation in zone AB[1]:  Here, G does not want group B to 
evacuate, however group B prefers evacuation. The conflicting interest between authority and groups 
results from three causes: the two information asymmetries (related to flood impact and anti-
congestion investment) and the weighting factors  and  . With respect to the information 
asymmetries, people should be always better off to follow the government (whether they actually do 
depends on trust) but with respect to the preference parameters this is not necessarily the case. For 
example, it is possible that G puts highest weight on economic loss ( 1 = ) and lowest weight on 
citizens’ deprivation ( 0 = ). In such a case, G could act too cautiously not to endanger business 
activities too much and show less consideration for the affected population. However, in our model 
also economic losses have a short and long-term component and we assume that the long-term losses 
due to flood injuries exceed the short-run losses. Therefore, the outcomes of the compliance-game 
show a very low sensitivity with respect to changes in  and  .  
Government communication and compliance 
For its communication-decision in scenario S0, the government is guided by Proposition 1b. However, 
G’s communication must also be effective. The request of G is effective under two conditions. First, the 
respective addressee (group A, group B or both groups) of the request is impact-sensitive ( 2ip   
( , ,( 1)
Si
A B A BT  = ) and the level of competence-trust is high enough ( , ,
c
A B A B  ). The first condition 
refers to a situation where a group expects maximal impact (remember, impact is the subjective 
probability that “an event really hits me”) but does not evaluate the consequences high enough 
compared to the less precautious alternative. In such a situation, impact-communication is effectless, 
even with the highest level of trust. The second requirement, a sufficiently high trust-level, is 
straightforward. If a group is impact-sensitive, their decision can theoretically be influenced but 
whether this influence is successful depends on the group’s perception of the credibility and 
trustfulness of the sender. The lower the trust-level ,
c
A B , the more weight is put on the “autonomous” 
impact parameter ,ˆ0 1A B    (the groups judge the impact on their own). We define *|E   as the 
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optimal strategy of G if the communication is effective and *|E  if communication is ineffective. 
Expression (51) summarizes the optimal strategies of the government.  
0 ( 0, 0)
* | 1 ( 1, 0)





E E v v
E v v
  = =

 =  = =
  = =
  * | 0, 1, 2E E E E E=       (51) 
If communication is effective, the government chooses the optimal strategy according to its objective. 
This strategy minimizes the social cost-function according to Proposition 1b. If, however, 
communication is ineffective, the chosen strategy is irrelevant and therefore the whole strategy-set 
applies. We use the symbol *|E  to indicate ineffective communication and E
  as a symbol for the 
universal set, which comprises the entire set of signals.  
Before we present the equilibrium, we first illustrate graphically how to determine the government’s 
optimal decision. For this example illustration we just focus on 01
S
AT  as the decision-threshold, which 
determines whether just group A decides about evacuation. As known from expression (25), this 
threshold corresponds to a line with negative slope 1. To make the scope for communication visible, 
we express A  by its explicit term ˆ(1 )
c c
A A A A AE   = + − , which contains the binary signal 
{0,1}AE   (as presented in section 4.1). As long as there is a minimum-level of trust ( 0
c
A  ), the 
threshold-line 01
S
AT  extends to a range or spectrum of threshold-lines with the lower and upper bound 
defined by 1AE =  and 0AE =  respectively. Diagram (a) of figure 5 gives an example of such a 
threshold-spectrum. With respect to the threshold-line of group A ( 01
S
AT ), the spectrum is highlighted 
by blue color together with its lower bound 01 ( 1)
S




A AT E = . The dotted 
line in the middle of the spectrum indicates the autonomous impact-level ˆ A , which determines the 











Figure 5. Zones of Compliance (ZoC) for different constellations   
If the probability-point   lies within this range, the government can directly influence the group’s 
decision with its request. Therefore, we call the threshold-spectrum “zone of compliance” (ZoC). 
Diagram (a) represents the case of a too narrow range (small ZoC) where the probability-point    lies 
outside ZoC ( 01
S








GT , i.e. in this situation group A 
does not evacuate (regardless of any request) although G wants it to do so. Hence, in this case the 
trust-level is not high enough and the authority cannot convince the group. Diagram (b) shows the 
same situation with the only difference that the trust-level is higher. The higher trust-level widens ZoC 
so that   is now located inside of this range ( 01
S
AZoC ). Although group A would be reluctant to 
evacuate in the case of an autonomous decision without trust (  lies below the dotted line), by 
sending the signal 1AE =  (more precisely, G sends signal 1E , which is received as 1AE =  by group 
A), the government can realize the lower bound of ZoC (straight red line at the bottom of ZoC). 






GT with the consequence that now G prefers no 
evacuation of group A. By sending the signal 0AE =  (signal 0AE =  from group A’s perspective), the 
government can realize the upper bound of ZoC (red black line at the top of ZoC). To summarize, 
given group A’s equilibrium strategy 01
S
AT , its trust-level 
c




GT  and a 
current projection defined by  : As long as 01
S
AZoC , the authority has influence on the decision of 
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group A. Note that there is just a need to intervene by communication if  lies between the critical 
thresholds 01
S




GT  (otherwise there is no conflict of interest, regardless of the scope for 
compliance). 
The diagrams (d) – (f) show the critical thresholds and ZoCs for both groups; the ZoC of group A is 
colored blue and ZoC of group B is colored green. The only difference between these three pictures is 
again the trust-level while the position of  remains unchanged. In diagram (d) the trust-level is too 
low and the probability point lies outside both ZoCs. The optimal group strategies are evacuation for 
group A (
* 1Av = ) and no evacuation for group B (
* 0Bv = ). These decisions are not influenced by G, 
which means that G’s optimal strategy is  * | 0, 1, 2E E E E E=  . In words: As G’s 
communication is ineffective, G can communicate anything; the signals do not matter. In diagram (e), 
the trust-levels of both groups are higher and now   lies inside 01
S





Here G has influence on the decision of group A but not on the decision of B. In diagram (f), both ZoCs 
overlap. In this constellation, G has influence on the decisions of both groups. This overlapping 
constellation can easily occur for high levels of trust because in this case the groups are willing to adapt 
their impact-expectations mainly to the government’s judgement. Therefore, this represents the best 
possible constellation for G because it can directly influence both groups by one signal.  
5.5 Nash-Equilibrium (NE) of the Evacuation-Compliance-Game 
We can now combine the interim results as stated by Proposition 1a and Proposition 1b to derive the 
main result of the Evacuation-Compliance-Game. As the general structure of the solution is not altered 
by the scenarios, we state the result for all three scenarios (S0, S1 and S2) together. Assume that the 
current situation is state Si and the decision makers receive the warning ij . The Transition-Matrix S , 
the Likelihood-Matrix iL  and the conditional Posterior-Matrix iP  are defined as described above. The 
probability-point ( )| 1 2,i ijs i ip p =  respresents the ij -column of iP . Furthermore, the actors’ 
payoffs are given as described in sections 4.1 – 4.3 and for both groups and the government there are 




GT  and 2
Si
GT . Let 
*ˆ
Av  and 
*ˆ
Bv be the optimal group strategies under 
autonomous conditions (according to Propositions 1a, 2a and 3a), i.e. without government or with zero 




BZoC  represent the Zones of Compliance of both 




Result (NE of ECG) 
The following strategies represent a Nash-Equilibrium of the underlying subgame on stage 1 and stage 
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
= = = 
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 
= = = 
     






* * * *
2 1 2
| | * * * *
2 2 1
ˆ2, , 1( )
( ) ˆ{ 0, 1}, , 0
i ij i ij
Si
A A BSi Si G i i
s A s B Si
i G i A A B
E E v v vT p p
ZoC ZoC
p T p E E E v v v
 
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  ( )* * * * *| ˆ ˆ{ 0, 1, 2}, ,i ij
Si Si
s A B A A B BZoC ZoC E E E E E v v v v
    = = = =  (55) 
The equilibrium-conditions read as follows: Expression (52) considers the case where the probability-
points lies in an area where the two ZoCs overlap. In this case, the government can advise both groups 
according to its own preferences, which can be summarized by the relative position of   and the 
critical thresholds of G. Note that the groups’ preferences do not matter for this constellation: Even if 
there is no conflict of interest (i.e. the groups pursue the same goal as G) the government still needs 
to care about its communication because the groups follow the government with any order. In 
constellation (53),   lies in the ZoC of group A but not in the zone of B.  In this case the government 
just communicates to group A. Expression (54) represents the analogue constellation for group B; G’s 
communication just focusses on group B but group A cannot be reached. The final constellation, (55), 
represents the case where   lies outside both ZoCs. In this case, G has no communicative influence. 
Hence, in equilibrium the government communicates the universal set (signals are ignored by both 
groups) and the groups play their autonomous equilibrium strategies *ˆAv  and 
*ˆ
Bv .  
5.6 Equilibrium-analysis based on the empirical reference-data 
In this section we take a closer look at the derived equilibrium-conditions by applying the reference-
data introduced in sections 3.2 and 4.1. For the most part we focus on the escalation-scenario S0 with 
a warning-level 1 and 2 because we consider these two situations to be the most frequent and relevant 
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ones. For the standard parameters we chose the values ,ˆ.5, .5, .3, .5, .5A B I   = = = = =  and 
rather low trust-levels between , [0.2,0.4]
c
A B  . The situation 01  is depicted in Figure 6(a). It can be 
seen that G would strongly advise evacuation but group A would also evacuate anyway. At a minimum 
trust-level of .3cA  , which is illustrated in the graph, the ZoC is wide enough to embrace the 
probability-point. This means that – although group A would evacuate from alone – the government 
should advise evacuation to avoid misunderstandings: Compliant citizens could wrongly interpret a 
missing evacuation order as an all-clear signal. To summarize, for a warning-level 1 the risk-decision of 
group A and G are in line, but this needs an affirmation from the government if trust and compliance 
are sufficiently high. The critical threshold of group B is not shown in the graph because the (horizontal) 
ZoC of group B starts at a probability-value 
02 0.01p =  and is thus far above the probability-point. In 
other words, in the case of a level-1-warning in S0, group B is very far from evacuating.  
 
Figure 6: Variation of warning-level and preference-parameters for S0 
But how does this change if the coastal city receives a level-2-warning? This situation is illustrated in 
diagram (b). The probability-point slightly moves to the upper-left and the critical threshold of group 
A shrinks downwards because the autonomous impact-expectation is close to 1 ( 1WA = − ). This 
means that group A would try whatever possible to get out of the region. However, for the chosen 
parameters, group B would not evacuate and the probability-point still remains below the critical 
threshold of the government. Hence, in spite of a level-2-warning, region B would not evacuate. Is this 
decision too risky? Above all, this decision takes into account the trade-off between physical damage 
and potential death on the one hand but also the cost of evacuation, which comprise deprivation and 
economic losses, on the other hand. If we ignore this trade-off and just take injuries and fatalities into 
consideration, the decision would be different as shown by Figure 6(c). Here we changed the 
government’s preference parameters and eliminated any other factor ( 0, 0 = = ) so that physical 
damage alone determines the decision. We see that a government, which exclusively cares for lives, 
would order evacuation of region B. This, however, is without success because the probability-point is 
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not covered by the ZoC of group B. Even maximal trust would not be sufficient to change this situation: 
Full trust ( 1cB = ) would expand the ZoC and thus move the lower bound downwards, but only up to 
the value 
02 0.0011p = , which is still above the probability-point. For the case of a level-2-warning we 
conclude that for the empirical reference data, which we took as a basis for our study, we find 
ourselves in the conflicting trade-off between “protection from damage” and “damage through 
protection” and the bad news is that this conflict cannot be overcome by trust and compliance. For 
the other two situations S1 and S2, we get quite clear results, which is mainly due to the high 
probability values of the (conditional) posterior probabilities. Once region A or region B is affected by 
a flood, the government and the groups decide to stay evacuated and not to return. These situations 
are so clear – in the sense that the probability-point is largely out of sight – that there is no issue for 
compliance. However, there is one constellation where compliance matters and this is exactly due to 
the high exposure: For our parameter constellation in S1, group B is close to evacuate when a warning-
1-level is received. However, even for low values of trust the zone of compliance covers the probability-
point so that unnecessary evacuation should not occur.    
6. Summary and Discussion 
In this contribution we presented the Warning-Compliance-Model (WCM) as a novel and 
comprehensive approach to study probabilistic and communicative aspects of public risk management 
and compliance within one coherent framework. The random events were modeled using a Hidden 
Markov chain and depicted both the escalation and de-escalation phases of hypothetical severe flood 
events. At the same time, the performance of the EWS can be taken into account by determining the 
Likelihood-Matrix accordingly. Since approaches of the literature on EWS-verification usually work 
with contingency tables, the information system of the WCM can also be linked empirically.  
The second part of the model included the communication game between the government and the 
two population groups under consideration. First, the optimal strategies of the groups were 
determined for all states of the Hidden Markov chain, representing either the evacuation decision or 
the decision to return to the region. On the part of the government, the socially desired solutions were 
determined from the perspective of the policy maker. The model is kept as simple as possible from a 
technical point of view and allows the explicit derivation of the stationary solutions of the model in a 
generic form. The methodological core of the communication game is the compliance of the 
population with the (non-enforceable) orders of the government. Compliance helps the two groups (A 
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and B) to overcome their information asymmetry vis-à-vis the state, provided their trust in the 
authority is sufficiently high. The higher the trust in the state, the more willing the two groups are to 
follow the instructions for a given probability distribution (as depicted in a compact form by the 
probability point). 
First, it is clear that compliance is only necessary when the interests of the population and the state 
diverge. Nevertheless, it should be noted that even if interests are aligned and trust is sufficiently high 
(compliance without conflict of interest), the state must communicate affirmatively to avoid 
misunderstandings. Since in this model - but ultimately also in all real world communication - silence 
also represents a signal, it would be dangerous if the state did nothing, in the deceptive certainty that 
the population itself already knew best what to do. In this respect it is clear that not only compliance 
is needed for an effective communication strategy, but also an effective communication strategy is 
needed to give a compliant group orientation during a crisis. Second, if there is a conflict of interest, it 
is no longer the distance between the critical thresholds that determines the outcome of the 
communication game, but whether the probability-point lies in the Zone of Compliance. In other 
words: Not the interests or preferences of the state per se, but the credibility of its message together 
with the objective probability of the risk ultimately determine whether compliance can arise. 
The application of empirical data from flood and risk studies to the model provides plausible results 
for the escalation scenario. For the de-escalation phase, the assumptions made and the probabilities 
suggested by the experts led to the clear result that the population in region A would already evacuate 
on its own initiative, but that the state would also order this evacuation. Since the probability point in 
this constellation lies with the Zone of Compliance for already rather low trust values, this is a quite 
clear case for the necessity of affirmative communication as described above. 
The results for an announced Black Swan flood show that the inhabitants of region B would not react 
to an S2 warning. Remarkably, however, the government would not issue an evacuation order either, 
taking into account economic follow-up costs and the particular burden on the people that an 
evacuation would entail. Only when the government considers the costs of an evacuation to be very 
low compared to the expected consequences for life and limb caused by an extreme flood the authority 
would order an evacuation. In this case, however, the critical threshold lines of state and population 
group B, which in the model indicate readiness to evacuate, fall far apart. In order for Group B to be 
persuaded to evacuate via compliance, it must have a very high level of trust, since otherwise the 
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probability-point of a black swan event would no longer lie in the (from the citizens' point of view) 
impact-relevant area. 
What does all this imply for improved disaster management? The Warning-Compliance-Model 
illustrates the intricate interaction between objective event probabilities, the precision of forecasting 
technology, the authority’s and public’s preferences as well as the role of trust in a communication 
game. The model can be very helpful to determine the effects of e.g. a higher EWS-precision or a higher 
trust-level on the scope for compliance and hence on the outcome in the case of a severe or disastrous 
flood event. Furthermore, the model shows that many different and important problems in the context 
of flood evacuation, which are predominantly looked separately and from a purely empirical 
perspective, such as risk communication, the crying-wolf-phenomenon or conflicts of interest, can be 
better seen as elements of one comprehensive picture. The WCM is best understood as a first step to 
identify the interlinkages between these different areas. More concrete, policy makers could consider 
some implications of this study for the development or training application of Evacuation Maps (Wilson 
2018). As different geographic areas correspond to different risk profiles and this in turn will influence 
people’s expectations, it is possible to derive a rough and preliminary guess of people’s probable 
decisions and the corresponding level of (expected) compliance. One further implication of the results 
of this study relates to risk communication. Risk communication in advance increases the impact 
expectation, which in turn requires less compliance. However, since both, compliance and risk 
communication, will depend on the same type of trust (competence trust in the authorities), this will 
enable the government to better empower people to make independent decisions before a crisis. This 
strategy, however, is particularly dependent on public trust, because it also means that too little trust 
in competence destroys both options: The population will not be convinced, either in advance or in 
the event of an approaching crisis, that the flood could affect them.  
Finally, we also want to briefly discuss potentially problematic assumptions of the model as well as 
promising model extensions.  As already mentioned we admit that the assumption of a representative 
decision maker for each group simplifies away some interesting and important aspects. It is promising 
to take the heterogeneity of people into account because differences in preferences of stakeholders 
will have an impact on their willingness to evacuate (e.g. vulnerable people, such as assisted care 
individuals, or gender differences (Bateman & Edwards 2002). We also assume that the assignments 
of buildings and individuals to zones is clear-cut. However, this is far from straightforward: “A study 
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before Hurricane Irene found that 83% of adults without a high-school education (e.g. 46% of East 
Harlem’s population in 2006) could not identify their evacuation zone.” (Wilson 2018, p.9). Similarly, 
special forms of evacuation such as long term resettlements and relocations (Sorensen & Sorensen, 
2006) are less well representable in the model, either. With respect to the preferences, we assume in 
our model that just the government takes economic losses into account. However, this will also be an 
important motive for small businesses. Finally, it could be very promising to apply more psychological 
approaches like risk perception theory, prospect theory or protection motivation theory to this 
framework. One complicating challenge of such an extension is that this introduces path-dependence 
into the model so that the derived closed-form solutions are just relevant for the described stationary 
solutions. Nevertheless, risk perception is ultimately a history-dependent phenomenon and it should 
be feasible to add this component to the Warning Compliance Model.  
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Appendix 2 
Proof of Proposition 2a: For ( 0, 0)A Bv v= =  to be a NE, two conditions (I) 
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fulfilled. In words, both groups must strictly prefer not to evacuate provided that the other group sticks 
to the no-evacuation-strategy, too. For each condition, there is a critical threshold for 
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